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THE ORGANISATIONAL SIDE OF MAJOR ACCIDENTS AND SAFETY: PERSPECTIVES ON
TRANSFORMING KNOWLEDGE INTO PRACTICES
Jean-christophe Le Coze and Nicolas Dechy
INERIS (Institut National de l'Environnement Industriel et des Risques), Accidental Risk Division, Parc Alata, 60550,
Verneuil-en-Hallate, France; e-mail: jean-christophe.lecoze@ineris.fr, nicolas.dechy@ineris.fr
In September 2006, Michel Llory, an author in the field of the organisational side of major accidents
(1996, 1999) organised a two days seminar focused on the organisational dimension of safety. Fol-
lowing twenty years of research in the field, from the debates around the High Reliable Organis-
ation (i.e. Roberts, 1990) and Normal Accident (i.e. Perrow, 1984), through the Normalisation of
deviance (Vaughan, 1996) and some recent important investigations following major accidents
(Paddington, 1999, Columbia, 2003) and other insightful contributions (Hopkins, 2000, 2005),
the theme of the seminar was to question the state of the art regarding the core concepts and meth-
odologies of the organisational side of safety, but also to address its practical impact within indus-
try. Contributors from various French bodies where present (INERIS, National Institute for
Environmental Safety; IRSN, Institute for Nuclear Safety and Radioprotection), but also research-
ers in the field as well as companies (Air France, EDF, CEA). Several themes from the organis-
ational side of safety were debated such as:
— The tradeoff between production versus safety,
— the dark side of organisations,
— the nature of the accident dynamic,
— the assessment of organisation,
— the organisational side of safety in the practices of the industry and development strategy.
This paper provides a summary of one of the contribution proposed by the authors of this paper
for the seminar. The contribution deals with the development of the organisational dimension of
safety into industry practices. In order to elaborate on this topic, the paper distinguished among
several concepts such as safety management systems, behaviours, human factors and organis-
ational factors. It is stressed that these various expressions cover different understanding of some-
times similar phenomena. The meaning of these terms vary from managers, in companies to
researchers in human and social sciences. An important part of this paper is dedicated to an
attempt to clarify these different meanings. This is seen helpful to clarify some of the problems.
Some directions are then suggested to help for the development of the organisational side of
safety in practices.
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CONTEXT OF THE STATEMENT, THE ANALYSIS
AND THE PROPOSALS
This paper is based on some years of experience by the
authors in developing various type of research programs
dealing with the integration of human and organisational
factors into risk assessment, safety auditing and investi-
gations following accidents. In parallel to these research
programs, consultancies have been regularly performed for
the industry and control authorities, mainly in the field of
investigating accidents and auditing safety management
systems, but also in the more traditional field of risk analy-
sis. On the basis of practices in design, risk analysis and
assessment, safety studies and accident investigations
widely in use in industry and existing consulting activities,
one of the aim of INERIS, along with developing knowledge
in the field, has been to try to introduce and transfer human
and social sciences (through human factors and
organisational factors) into these practices, while also ques-
tioning the ability to do so, when background regarding
these issues is limited within the industry, where engineer-
ing is the most dominant profile. Our initial engineering
background has been used as a support for a better
understanding of the gaps between the different views that
are presented in this paper. The industry domain covered
is mainly the chemical, petrochemical industry.
DIFFERENT UNDERSTANDINGS OF HUMAN
FACTORS, ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS AND
SAFETY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS
In this part we suggest a way of distinguishing the
expressions in use for considering different domains,
according to what they represent. This helps to identify
some of the issues.
Safety management systems (SMS), human factors (HF)
and organisational factors (OF)
Safety management systems (SMS)
According to our experiences, when the term "organisation"
is used and thought within the industry when it comes to
safety, it is strongly associated with the principles of
Safety Management Systems (SMS). It implies a rather
"structural" or also "rational" vision of the organisation.
By "rational" or "structural", we mean that functions,
responsibilities and skills are clearly defined for people
according to specified goals, and as a result, the organisation
should behave in a rational way, according to its description
and purposes. This type of representation is influenced
by the quality approach, associated with the "Plan,
Do, Check, Act" (the Deming wheel) and "continuous
improvement" principles. This representation leads to a
decomposition of the system in activities or processes
(often described by procedures) that are articulated in
order to provide the expected outcomes of the system.
This approach is aimed at managing and monitoring the
activities thanks to appropriate indicators. This principle is
at the core of many standards (such as ISO 9000, ISO
14, 000 but also OHSAS 18, 000) but can be also found in
a way, although not detailed as much as in these standards,
in regulations such as in Seveso II Directive framework. In
safety, activities such as risk analysis and assessment, emer-
gency preparedness, management of change, roles and
responsibilities etc need to be described and implemented
for managing safely. It is often therefore that the description
of the activities becomes consequently the "reality" against
which people should be complying, and therefore be
assessed. It represents an "ideal" or "rational" system to
be put in motion. This is sometimes described in companies
as a "system approach", although we would not associate it
to a systemic approach (but this is a question of definition).
Without understanding that this is what managers and
safety managers, when influenced by a engineering back-
ground, have in mind when they talk about organisations
and safety, it is hard to see why difficulties arise when
other approaches of organisations, bringing other ways of
thinking the organisational dimension, are suggested (this
point is discussed after). But in order to go ahead, we intro-
duce now the human perspective (human factors) such as it
is introduced, according to us, in companies, along with the
SMS approach. This will also help, we hope, to clarify better
the situation.
Human factors (HF) and Safety Management
Systems (SMS)
The way Human Factors are seen is summarised in the fol-
lowing figure (figure 1).
This type of representation implies that following
technology, engineering efforts and implementation of safety
management systems, the next improvement should be
through the human factor dimension. It is an interesting rep-
resentation, that Hopkins (2006) has commented this way:
"It has to be said that this three stage analysis is
highly contestable; indeed the analysis of Hale and others
flatly contradicts it. They assert that a first age of technical,
engineering improvements was succeeded by a second age,
in the 1960s and 1970s in which human factors were seen as
the central issues to be addressed. The late 1980s saw the
dawn of a third age in which the structure and functioning
of management was seen to be crucial (Hale and
Hovden, 1998). "
We also think that this representation is the symptom
of a gap between a research community from various disci-
plinary backgrounds (dealing with human factors and
organisational factors) and the industry in general (but this
gap would probably be different depending on the indus-
tries: nuclear, chemical, aeronautical, transport...). The
gap is in the way human factors are understood in industry,
compared to how it is understood in the research commu-
nity. Based on our experience, human factors in industry
concern mainly the "last bit" that can't be totally controlled
and that need to be solved by providing the appropriate pro-
cedures, but also by providing the proper work situation,
with a rather physiological approach of this work situation
(light, space, size etc). Indeed, when you have made all
the efforts to write down and to articulate the activities of
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Figure 1. From engineering to HF following SMS
a safety management system and also taken into account the
work context, then the only problem arise when people do
not comply with what they are supposed to do. As a conse-
quence, following safety management system, the next step
is to ensure that "disciplined" people will follow what is
expected from them to do. This leads to figure 1 type of
rationale. It might sound as an extreme way of describing
the underlying models behind safety management system
and human factors within industry, but our experience is
that this type of rather technical way of thinking (namely
that people are "components" to fit into a well defined -
and well thought - organisational structure), is widely
shared. To go with this, three principles are often brought
into the explanation for human behaviour that would not
comply with what has been defined:
- the motivation issue (everybody remembers the Maslow
pyramid . . . )
- the impact of external life into the practices ("when
someone has a bad time at home, this is when human
factors can have an impact")
- the analogy with the situation of driving above the speed
limits for an illustration of by-passing procedure
This type of "models" (that are mainly "behaviourist")
for interpreting human behaviour are rather limited and lead
to difficulties when it comes to explaining incidents and acci-
dents, or also to audit working situations where discrepancies
are for instance noticed between procedures and "real"
activities. The use of check list integrating human factors
dimensions are often supporting tools for incident investi-
gation or for short audits of practices. But, how can these
checklists be used when so little knowledge is available for
users about human factors and behaviour? Key items in
check lists do not mean much when there is no theoretical
background helping people to describe and understand situ-
ations, and to articulate together these various dimensions
(for instance, from "procedures" to "light" through "stress"
items). It is as if for understanding a chemical reaction, we
would rely on common sense, with no background models
in chemistry. The comparison with human factors assess-
ment is not much different at a first level of analogy. How
do you integrate in a appropriate way the potential effect
of "procedures", "stress" and "light", for making sense of a
situation (following an incident or a working situation) and
assess it? It is quite a complex situation to deal with. Of
course, we, as humans, do experience the presence of pro-
cedures, we do experience at times stressful situations and
we have a good idea (in a "common sense" perspective) of
what the impact of light on an activity is about. We do experi-
ence these probably enough to have an idea of how to
proceed to evaluate other situations that people face or
have faced, based on our own experiences. In comparison,
it is true that we don't, everyday, experiment chemical reac-
tions, with no knowledge on chemistry. The analogy with
chemistry and process has therefore its limits. But it has defi-
nitely its interest too. Indeed, because of this feeling that
"common sense" can be used for dealing with human
factors, it leads to think that no specific knowledge or
sophisticated one is available (it is "soft" sciences, after
all). As a consequence, they don't need to worry much
about the conceptual dimension behind it. And without it,
things do work pretty well anyway. Until incident and acci-
dent happen of course and reveal that situations (technically
and organisationally) were maybe not that adequate and not
that well thought of. As a result, the representation of what
human factors are in the industry (from our point of view)
is far from what it is for human factors scientists. It is not a
major problem because people can't be expert in everything,
that would make no sense and a technical and engineering
background is necessary for operating plants. But when the
level of awareness is very low regarding the nature of knowl-
edge implied for dealing with human factors, then it becomes
extremely difficult to support its development in practices.
And the issue is very similar when we move from human
factors to organisational factors.
Safety management systems and organisational factors
When we move away from the "isolated"1 individual beha-
viour at the level of the work space, and get into another
dimension of the problem, closer to the organisational
factors such as described in the literature, then we penetrate
into the area of what is often identify in the industry as the
"safety culture" where "safety first" and "safety is everyone
business" are the key drivers for bringing some "oil" into the
safety "rational" management system. However first, there
are difficulties with the concept of culture (Hale, 2001,
Hopkins, 2005), because it is a rather abstract concept, dif-
ficult to identify, difficult to assess but also to manage
directly and practically. Moreover and secondly, Hopkins
(2005) has shown how the cultural approach was understood
within the industry (here again, the statement should not be
understood as too generic and representing all industries): it
is ultimately understood that the "safety culture" is located
in individuals mindset. It is not understood as a feature of
the organisation, as an emergent properties resulting from
the safety practices and multiple daily tradeoffs regarding
production and safety between managers and workers, that
can't be attributed only to individuals, at the sharp end. In
fact, many of the organisational insights provided by the lit-
erature on accidents and safety provides conceptual
elements to think more globally the issue of safety, to
escape a narrow vision focused on the individual and on a
limited vision of what a "safety culture" is (or could be).
Dimensions such as social redundancy, bounded rationality
issues that apply to all decision makers from managers to
workers, organisational learning, the impact of centralisa-
tion or decentralisation on practices, the presence of
counter intuitive effects and the use of power, are never in
the explanation of incidents or never integrated in safety
auditing2 . As noted above, all these conceptual elements
1Of course, nobody is ever really isolated, we always interact with
others and the physical environment, it is more a way here of defining
a level of description, in a "common sense".
2For a better description of available organisational models in accident and
safety but also more generally in organisational theory, see Le Coze (2005).
do not fit in a vision of the organisation where some
principles derive from a more technical or engineering per-
spective of it. Génelot (2001), a consultant and researcher in
management has identified some core principles still widely
shared among managers:
• Management by planning and objectives,
• The implementation by tasks and coordination by
standardisation,
• The assumption of an optimal organisation,
• The primary importance of the structure,
• The principle of discipline,
• The focus only on economical results.
With such a definition of the organisation, it will indeed
always be ultimately the individuals, or in an "disembodied"
way, the "ideal" structural safety management system that
didn't work as expected, as if structures and activities them-
selves were behaving without individuals implementing
them. Without another vision of the organisational factors,
then "common sense", as for human factors, gets back into
the picture and understanding incidents or safety auditing
can therefore be done without getting into the details of
other available and more elaborated models of organisation
behaviour. We find ourselves in the same situation as with
human factors, where people interacting, at several levels of
the organisation need to understand how, through their inter-
actions and the problem that they face collectively, generate
patterns leading to safety problems. This is what organis-
ational factors are about. But this again is a situation where
a deep gap exists between available models from the
researches compared to the models used in practices.
On top of this, that makes it even more difficult than
with human factors; these patterns are, first and as
explained, complex to describe for untrained people (they
need some conceptual support), but secondly as well as
more importantly, most managers see it in a bad way to be
included "in the loop". Managers see in a bad way to be
identified as important contributors generating and sustain-
ing inadequate safety patterns. This issue of including
higher levels in the explanation is also one of the difficulty,
on top of the conceptual difficulty. Managers do not like to
be the targets of the audit or investigations following acci-
dents or incident. It is indeed much better to limit the pro-
blems to the operator level. For obvious reasons, when
you have the power not to be seen as the source of the
problem, you get away with it. It is much better for your
self esteem first but also for your carrier, that depends on
those who assess your ability to manage. If you appear to
be part of the problem, that's not really good. And this
leads to the search for the scape goat. We have faced it in
almost all incident and accident investigation. It is always
an operator fault, an inadequate behaviour of an "isolated"
individual, sometimes even if it is within a team, one of
them will be chosen as the faulty operator. If not, and
if the accident really need to take into account organis-
ational issues, then the structural, "disembodied" safety
management system will be targeted. This will be done
without indicating much about what decisions were taken
at the higher levels within the safety management system.
There is nothing much new here, but it is very much a diffi-
culty on top of the conceptual one. The conceptual and
accountability difficulties are, we think, very interdependent
as we illustrate it with the example of "prevention, not
blame".
Some of the advanced companies in safety manage-
ment have captured messages coming from the research
area about the inadequacy of focusing on "human error".
As a result, we can therefore sometimes hear that what
should be the approach is "prevention, not blame", so
that investigation or auditing should be done without focus-
ing on individual behaviours with the idea of blaming. The
result is sometimes that behaviours are never investigated
and understood because the aim is to prevent, and not to
blame. So initially, the good idea of not blaming leads
eventually to not taking behaviours at all into account in
incident or accident investigation. We have seen this situ-
ation at least on one site. This, we believe, results partly
from the fact that people find difficult to judge a mistake
without deep understanding of human behaviour in techni-
cal, collective and organisational contexts. Blame should
not be a problem if the situation requires it, but how to
make the judgement without a good idea of what are the
relevant models to be used for judging? It is true that, natu-
rally, when going back to the events leading to an incident
and accident for example, every decision appear to partici-
pate to the occurrence of the event. Everyone taking a
decision "shaping the landscape of risk control" (Rasmus-
sen and Svedung, 2000) can potentially be seen as one to be
blamed. It is not an easy situation to deal with because
safety patterns are generated by people interacting.
Dekker (2006) has well identified some of the traps of
this perspective when investigating "human error" at the
sharp end. A similar problem is faced when organisational
dimensions are taken into account, when it leads to higher
levels that are identified as creating the circumstances for
the incident or accident to happen. The issue of blame do
not always accommodate well with the systemic type of
understanding. Often, the generated pattern can't be attrib-
uted to a single individual and the blame is diluted within
the global organisation behaviour. However, if the
purpose is certainly not to blame straight away, a good
understanding of decisions and behaviours of many actors
at different levels can't be avoided if we want to learn
something from the point of view of the organisational
dimensions of safety, and to think of appropriate preventing
measures. If behaviours are not taken into account because
the issue of blame is to difficult to deal with and meet
accountability inhibition, then opportunities for learning
may be more difficult.
SOME SUGGESTED DIRECTIONS FOR
DEVELOPING ORGANISATIONAL FACTORS
This discussion on the definition of "safety management
systems", "human factors" and "organisational factors"
from the perspective of the industry and from the perspec-
tive of the research community indicates a real gap. This
gap has strong impact on the opportunities for developing
organisational factors in the industry. We have raised the
problem, in the field of learning from accident, by
distinguishing the purpose of models (Le Coze, 2007).
From prescriptive (with a more practical perspective) to
descriptive models, the range of approaches is wide and
generate different type of problems. We have for example
identified models created by scientists with the purpose of
generating new insights, from models used by professional
investigators within bodies or within internal company
departments (this role is sometimes played by safety man-
agers). Other models are those models designed specifically
for providing recommendations, because based on best
practices for dealing with some human and organisational
factors dimensions. The best practices articulated in the
model are extracted from the industry. According to the
purpose then resources needed (time, access to information,
competencies) are very different. The same type of
approach can be retained for human and organisational
factors in general, and if we leave the field of learning
from accident. Depending on the purposes, and resources
available (skills, access to data, time etc), different things
can be done. When it comes to human factors and organis-
ational factors in the industry, the level of resources (access
to data, skills available from human factors and organis-
ational factors specialists, time available) is often rather
low. Given the purpose to improve the management of
safety by introducing human and organisational factors,
the existing constraints are quite important. It makes devel-
opments really difficult. We can therefore only subscribe to
the following statement by Hollnagel and Woods (2006) "A
model that is cumbersome and costly to use will from the very
start be at disadvantage, even if it from an academic point of
view provides a better explanation. The trick is therefore to
find a model that at the same time is so simple that it can be
used without engendering problems or requiring too much
specialised knowledge, yet powerful enough to go beneath
the often deceptive surface descriptions. The problem with
any powerful model is that it very quickly becomes "second
nature ", which means that we no longer realise the simplifi-
cations it embodies. This should, however not lead to the con-
clusion that we must give up on models and try to describe
reality as it really is, since this is a philosophically naive
notion. The consequence is rather that we should acknowl-
edge the simplifications that the model brings, and carefully
weigh advantages against disadvantages so that a choice of
model is made knowingly". However, the challenge is great.
As a way of moving forward, we suggested 2
directions in our contribution to the seminar:
1. There is a great need for making usable some of the
concepts from the organisational factors domains.
2. There is a need to introduce human and social sciences
and systemic thinking in engineers training.
For the first direction, research should focus on the
ability to introduce within the safety management system
framework, some of the important messages regarding
organisational factors in safety. This is a difficult position
where research should be carried out with the intent to
introduce within current practices, as far as possible, some
concepts from the organisational factor literature that have
not been thought for being part of safety management
systems. It would imply therefore a action-research type
of approach, where the practical dimension is the purpose
of the theoretical developments, so that the modelling
results can fit in the current mindset, by "enhancing" it
with regards to organisational factors. This is to be linked
with the quote in this paper from Hollnagel and Woods.
This approach might however not be expected to be able
to produce too much and reach great results, when lack of
basic knowledge regarding social sciences within industry
(we imply here the chemical and petrochemical industry)
is very important.
This therefore leads to the training needs for engin-
eers. Training for engineers really needs to include recent
developments from the social sciences, but also from
recent epistemological and scientific developments regard-
ing our understanding of the world, as for example the
developments in the field of complexity. We have suggested
this idea in a previous paper (Le Coze et al., 2006), by dis-
cussing the importance for thinking the complexity of the
problems involved in safety and accident when dealing
with human, organisational and social issues. As the Turn-
bull report indicated: "Engineers are accustomed to
dealing with uncertainties in the properties and behaviour
of materials (. ..) while undoubtedly there is in some of
these situations elements of technology inadequacy or
failure, the main difficulties and problems lie at the inter-
faces of technology with commercial, political and social
constituencies. The uncertainties inherent in these external
constituencies are quite different in kind from the uncertain-
ties that engineers traditionally deal with in addressing
technological issues. They are much more qualitative than
quantitative and they embrace a whole raft of cultural and
emotional factors that often contradict apparently obvious
logic. Engineers find this difficult domain to deal with."
An effort has to be done for changing mindset and world-
views so that other type of approaches will get introduced
into current practices. This is true for engineers being cur-
rently trained but also for engineers now working in the
industry. Improvements in the way organisational factors
(but also human factors) are perceived can evolve. It does
happen, although following exceptional circumstances (the
Columbia accident in 2003): "As an engineer turned
manager for a time, I shared many in the science commu-
nity's scepticism of organisational theory, such as discussed
in this volume. Observing NASA management struggle with
the shuttle and space station, I have gained a better appreci-
ation of how these theories can help structure a more
effective high reliability learning organisation in a very
complicated high technology environment replete with
ambiguous safety signals." (Mc Donald, 2005).
THANKS
To the French Ecology and Sustainable Development
Ministry that financed our studies.
REFERENCES
Columbia accident investigation board. 2003. Report
Volume 1, August 2003. Washington, D.C.: Government
printing office.
Dekker, S. W. 2006. The field guide to understanding human
error. Ashgate.
Génelot, D. 2001. Manager dans la complexité. 3eme édition.
Editions INSEP Consulting.
Hale A.R. Culture's confusions. (2001) Editorial for the
Special issue on safety culture and safety climate. Safety
Science. 34. 1-14.
Hopkins, A. 2000. Lessons learnt from Longford. The Esso gas
plant explosion. CCH.
Hopkins, A. 2005. Safety, culture and risk. CCH.
Hopkins, A. 2006a. What are we to make of safe
behaviour programs? Safety Science. Volume 44. Issue 7,
p 583-597.
Ladbroke Grove Rail Inquiry. 2001. Part 1 & 2 Reports. The Rt
Hon Lord Cullen PC. HSE Books.
Le Coze, J-C. 2007. Disasters and organisations : from lessons
learnt to theorizing. Safety Science. Forthcoming.
Le Coze, JC., Salvi, O., Gaston, D. 2006. Compexity and multi
(inter or trans-) disciplinary sciences : which job for
engineers in risk managament ? Journal of risk research.
Vol 9 noà5, 569-582, July 2006.
Le Coze, JC. 2005. Are organisations too complex to be intro-
duced in technical risk assessment and current safety audit-
ing? Safety science (43) 613-638.
Llory, M. 1996. Accidents industriels : le coût du silence. Paris.
L'Harmattan.
Llory M. 1996. L'accident de la centrale nucléaire de Three
Miles Island. Paris. L'Harmattan.
Mc Donald, H. 2005. Observations on the Columbia accidents. In
Starbuck H. W., Farjoun M. 2005. Organization at the limit.
Lessons from the Columbia disaster. Blackwell publishing.
Hollnagel E., Woods D. D., (2006). Epilogue: resilience engin-
eering precepts, in Hollnagel E., Woods D., D., Leveson
N. Resilience Engineering: concepts and precepts. Ashgate.
Perrow, C. (1984). Normal accident, living with high risk tech-
nology. Second edition. New York: Basic Books.
Roberts K.H. (1990). Some characteristics of one type of high
reliability in organisation. Organisation Science, 1(2),
160-176.
Vaughan, D. (1999). The Dark Side of Organizations: Mistake,
Misconduct, and Disaster. Annual Review of Sociology, 25,
271-305.
